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SYMPOSIUM: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT, PART III
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AS SOCIAL SCIENCE
Kevin Davis*
I would like to take up Anna Gelpern’s invitation to define the study of
Law and Development broadly and to reject the presumption that the inquiry will focus narrowly on the law-related projects of bilateral aid agencies and international organizations.1
I am interested in the relationship between law on the one hand and, on
the other hand, development (however defined), and it is not clear to me
that externally directed ―Law and Development‖ projects are always central
to understanding that relationship. (Isn’t that a reasonable inference to draw
from all of the studies that question the impact of those projects?) Don’t
get me wrong, I think it is often crucially important to take foreign actors
into account when trying to understand where the ―law‖ part of the equation
comes from, as well as what factors besides law might be influencing development. But I am skeptical of the notion that foreign actors are always
central to the story, especially in some of the larger developing countries;
do we really understand the legal systems of Brazil, India, and China best
by focusing on the components influenced by the World Bank and the IMF?
As far as the future of Law and Development is concerned, I believe
that it will and should involve becoming even more of a social science. I
also believe, however, that the contributions to this Symposium have identified many of the pitfalls that lie in that direction. To begin with, there are
obviously methodological questions about what empirical methods are best
suited to uncovering the kinds of causal relationships between law and social outcomes we are looking for and theoretical questions about what legal
and social variables ought to be measured. But I think that there are even
more profound questions to be asked about the entire enterprise, especially
if the purpose is to give policymakers insights into ―what works.‖
The big outstanding questions about Law and Development include: Is
it ever likely to be possible to generalize about complex social phenomena?
Can scientific theories be treated as independent of the phenomena they
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seek to explain? What role should morality play in guiding the questions
that scholars ask? How should policymakers use scientific findings that
may attract varying degrees of support, either across different groups within
the scholarly community or over time? Treating Law and Development as a
social science should involve confronting rather than avoiding these philosophical questions. But since these issues are common to all social
sciences, I think that legal scholars will benefit from being exposed to other
scholars’ efforts to come to grips with them.
Finally, John Cioffi’s post touched on the interesting question of
whether Law and Development ought to focus on the study of law (broadly
defined) only as it affects developing countries or whether developed countries should also be considered.2 I do not think that there is any general answer to this question. For some purposes, focusing exclusively on
developing countries will seem wrong-headed. For instance, some might
argue that in studying the relationship between law and economic development, studying only the developing countries amounts to selecting on the
dependent variable, but the appropriateness of focusing exclusively on developing countries depends to some extent on the purpose of the study. If
the point of the exercise is to understand ―necessary‖ legal attributes of
―under-developed‖ societies, then limiting the analysis to the societies fitting that description may make sense. The same may be true if one is interested in studying the operations of organizations like USAID or the
International Development Association, whose activities are expressly limited to developing countries. Finally, there may be practical justifications
for specializing in developing societies or subsets thereof. Here again, the
value of assimilating Law and Development to the other social sciences is
that it would encourage us to refer to parallel debates. For example, why do
so many economists treat development economics as a separate field of
study? What is the current thinking in political science about the value of
area studies?
I do not know whether the kind of research agenda I have in mind is
too broad to be considered a ―field.‖ It might be. But, in any event, I think
it is a worthwhile agenda.
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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN LAW & DEVELOPMENT
Adam Feibelman*
On the threshold question, whether Law and Development is a field, I
am happy to follow Anna Gelpern’s lead and assume away any doubt.3 It
seems more fun, and hopefully more profitable, to discuss our definitional
quandaries and our concerns about the substance of work within the field
we assume to exist.
To that end, most of my comments below expand upon Salil Mehra’s
question about the relationship between international official-sector institutions (the World Bank, IMF, WHO, and development banks, for example)
and the field of Law and Development,4 with particular focus on the IMF.
As our discussion has unfolded, it has become strikingly clear that
these institutions play a central, perhaps dominant, role in the field of Law
and Development, however defined. Even if, as many emphasize, the crucial dramas play out in the local context, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that these international institutions have significant influence in such contexts. Sometimes their influence is heavy-handed, but often it is indirect,
propelling domestic actors in ways that are not easily traceable. India and
China, often cited as counter-examples to swathes of Law and Development
orthodoxy,5 may in fact reflect the pervasive (if indirect) influence of international institutions and actors. Although legal development in both countries has largely been the product of unique, local factors, each country has
pursued legal reforms that are largely consistent with the law-and-finance
project embraced by the international public sector in recent years. In the
areas of corporate bankruptcy and debt collection, for example, both countries have adopted at least some meaningful legal reforms that reflect many
of the same goals that the IMF and the World Bank (and INSOL and
UNCITRAL) have tried to advance more generally.6 Perhaps both countries would have adopted some such legal and regulatory reforms if the
World Bank, the IMF, INSOL, UNCITRAL, and other international actors
were not pushing or nudging sovereigns to do so. But it is easy to see these
types of reforms as evidence that many ―homegrown‖ law-reform projects
are at least partly the product of the influence of international institutions’
efforts to promote legal development in countries across the globe.
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At the very least, these institutions provide a nice focal point from
which to consider the broader definitional and substantive questions at
hand. And acknowledging the relevance—or the centrality—of these institutions to the field raises interesting questions that cut to the core of our definitional project. Perhaps most fundamentally: What about these
institutions is most interesting and/or important to the field of Law and Development? Determining precisely how these institutions relate to the field
may help elucidate the contours of the field itself; in other words, these international institutions can provide a useful definitional test for Law and
Development scholars.
Anna Gelpern’s distinction between Law & Development Narrow and
Law & Development Broad7 in turn provides a nice frame for considering
how these international institutions may help us grapple with these definitional questions. Consider the IMF, for example. Again, I suppose it is uncontroversial that some of the Fund’s activities would fall within a narrowly
defined conception of the field of Law and Development. This is true despite the fact that the Fund itself insists that it is not a development institution. Since the unraveling of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime,8 the
Fund’s original reason for being, it has increasingly conducted activities
that are designed to promote its members’ domestic economic growth and
stability. Of particular relevance for present purposes, the Fund has encouraged or pressed national governments to adopt and/or reform legal regimes through a variety of projects and activities, including conditionality,
surveillance, technical assistance, and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (the Fund’s joint project with the World Bank).9 These are among the
activities by the Fund that Law and Development scholars tend to focus
upon, evaluate, and criticize, quite often with good reason.
Yet the Fund conducts these activities in the context of a much broader
project—promoting exchange rate stability in the post-Bretton Woods
world. What then is the relevance of the Fund’s efforts to maintain exchange rate stability, its related surveillance functions, its efforts to help resolve sovereign debt crises, or its evolving role in global governance to the
field of Law and Development? The Fund’s broader project surely shapes
the narrower Law and Development-type activities noted above, though the
relationship may often be somewhat indirect. From the Fund’s point of
view, its efforts to influence domestic legal development will promote domestic stability, which in turn promotes exchange rate stability. But the
Fund’s more general project relating to exchange rate stability involves an
7
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elaborate legal framework, and this entire framework is aimed, at least in
part, at increasing domestic growth and, perhaps, development. In the
broadest sense, then, understanding the internal legal domain of the Fund
(for example, its organizational structure, governance, and jurisdiction) is
an independent Law and Development topic.
I suppose that all of this is a roundabout way of agreeing with Gelpern
(at least I think she agrees) that Law & Development Broad is an appealing
way to conceive of the field. Perhaps I am pushing further and suggesting
that this conception is inevitable. It not only helps capture the full set of
factors that influence the practice and process of Law and Development (as
well as legal development, if these are different things10). It also encompasses the role of international legal regimes (and legal aspects of global efforts) that aim to address macro-economic concerns of developing and
developed economies. And as Gelpern rightly observes, it therefore has the
potential to reverse the ―directionality‖ of the field in very promising ways.
Continuing with the Fund as an example, the current economic crisis arguably reflects serious weaknesses in the Fund’s regulatory surveillance of the
threats to external stability stemming from the domestic policies in developed economies, threats that may have devastating effects in developing
ones. To the extent that this is possible, it suggests that the Fund’s surveillance over developed members should be understood as falling well within
the scope of the field of Law and Development.

10
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DISTINGUISHING ―LAW AND DEVELOPMENT‖ FROM ―LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT‖
Brian Z. Tamanaha*
In a recent essay, The Primacy of Society and the Failures of Law and
Development, I asserted that it is best not to see Law and Development as a
―field.‖11 My aim was not to provoke a sterile debate over whether it qualifies for this designation—anything can constitute a ―field‖ if enough people
count it as such—but to help underline a sharper distinction between legal
development, which happens everywhere all the time without any particular
label, and Law and Development. Law and Development, I suggested, is
best understood as a label we attach to a host of projects funded and carried
out by an array of development organizations aimed at countries that are
tagged as insufficiently advanced capitalist economies or lacking features of
liberal democracies. This is not offered as a cynical characterization but rather as descriptively accurate.
Legal development is not the same as ―Law and Development‖—a distinction that the latter phrase tends to conceal. To illustrate the difference,
imagine how things would look if all current Law and Development
projects around the world were to cease immediately. In core respects, very
little would change. Legal institutions in all of the affected countries would
continue what they are doing, legal actors would go about their business
constructing the law on an ongoing basis, and these legal systems would
suffer from multiple flaws, as do all legal systems. Actors within these societies—government, businesses, organizations, individuals—would continue to interact with the legal system in their usual ways (invoking it,
avoiding it, adhering to it, trying to control it or use it to their advantage).
Actors both legal and not would continue to push and prod the legal system
in connection with demands that emerge within society. Assuming the existence of at least a minimally functioning legal system, this series of interactions is the dynamic ongoing process of legal development that takes
place in every organized society.
That is not to say that no consequences would follow from the termination of ―Law and Development‖ projects. Money that now goes into these
projects, estimated at around $4 billion since 1990, would disappear, as
would the small (widely dispersed) army of Law and Development practitioners. When divided up by country and spread over time this apparently
large sum is less impressive. For large countries, taking away this aid will
have hardly any impact on the daily functioning of the system. For small or
very poor countries, the financial loss would be felt, but the consequences
*
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of the loss would depend on what the Law and Development money was
being spent on at the time of the cutoff. Development organizations from
donor countries use some of the money to fund their operations, money that
recipient countries never see and therefore won’t miss. Law and Development money is rarely used to pay the salaries of legal officials, moreover, so
the legal systems in recipient countries likely would continue operating as
before; certain costly and technical projects, like computerization, likely
would not. There would almost certainly be fewer judicial training seminars run by outsiders, fewer conferences, and fewer trips abroad for local
officials.
Some of the projects that now take place through Law and Development would likely still be proposed. Many of the same reformist ideas circulate in every society today (promoted by activists, elites, economic actors,
lawyers committed to legal reform, etc.). Corrupt or poorly functioning legal systems are universally lamented. Businesses and local communities
need reliable and timely ways to resolve their disputes. The rights of laborers and women are issues grappled with in every society. Attempts to address these problems might well continue, though the amount of money
spent on such issues might diminish.
Without enjoying an artificial boost from money and pressure from the
outside, legal development projects would have to marshal sufficient local
support from influential players to prevail in local social/political contests
over reform. Local agendas and priorities would be pursued. The projects
would be designed, run, and implemented by people who understand the
situation, who know what is possible and understand what compromises
must be made, and who have long-term relationships (social and political
capital) to draw on in the course of implementation. None of this assures
the success of these new localized legal-development initiatives—legal development in every country is halting and uneven—but this consummately
local process of legal reform avoids several of the key flaws that plague
current Law and Development projects.
Despite the lengthy record of failed Law and Development projects
that has developed in the past five decades, one implication of this thought
experiment is that this record does not necessarily imply that legal development is failing. Rather, it means that while Law and Development goals
(mostly related to liberal democratic values and capitalism) and Law and
Development projects are not showing much success, legal development
still takes place. China, for example, is regularly cited as a failure in Law
and Development literature for not establishing independent courts, for corruption, for the harassment of activist lawyers, and for continued Party control over the judiciary12; yet in the past twenty-five years many new laws
have been passed, the number of cases handled by the Chinese court system
12
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has increased tenfold, a national code is being prepared, a master’s degree
in law is virtually required for a senior judicial position, the number of lawyers in private practice has gone from zero (previously all lawyers were
employees of the state) to 118,000 licensed lawyers in 12,000 firms, and
now ―more than 150,000 suits are filed annually against the government.‖13
That is substantial legal development. And it is not evident that any of this
development can be directly or indirectly attributed to Law and Development projects.
My thought experiment helps expose the fact that Law and Development projects are interventions in a legal system by outsiders. This observation is not itself a reason for condemnation—many Law and
Development initiatives are well-intentioned and might well be beneficial if
they worked. But this observation does highlight a crucial factor that conditions the operation and likelihood of success of most Law and Development
projects. External interventions into any society face barriers that internally
produced initiatives do not. Law poses a particular challenge for external
initiatives because it lies deeply imbricated within a thick complex of internally evolved normative orderings, power bases, and incentives that can be
nearly invisible from the outside.14
This thought experiment, finally, makes it clear that although Law and
Development projects are uniformly presented as projects for the benefit of
recipient countries and their citizens, they are often neither instigated nor
conducted by these recipients. Law and Development organizations and
practitioners must be called upon to justify, and to secure the genuine acceptance of, Law and Development projects (goals, designs, and modes of
implementation) to locals. Otherwise, these projects may invite resistance,
seen as more of the same old top-down, Western-imposed neo-imperialism.
Lurking in the background of the Law and Development enterprise is the
truth that many of these legal initiatives are not consensual but are imposed
in the form of ―good governance‖ conditions that must be met by recipient
countries to secure loans from international funding institutions.15 Historically, the economic and political agendas of donors and their operatives—
not pure altruism—have shaped which countries get help and what programs are carried out.16
The extraordinary attention now given to the promotion of the ―rule of
law‖ is the most spectacular example of a Law and Development-driven
agenda that is ill-conceived in connection with recipient countries. Many
13
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legal theorists consider the rule of law to be ―an essentially contested concept,‖ lacking any clear or singular meaning.17 In light of this, it is surprising that Law and Development organizations claim to have statistical
measures of the rule of law. These measures include a variety of factors,
from opinion polls, to ratings by businesses or institutes, to crime statistics,
to various indicators of contract enforcement and property rights—factors
that are combined in questionable ways. Relying upon these statistical
measures, researchers assert that the rule of law correlates with economic
development (duly acknowledging that causation remains unanswered),18
and aid organizations make decisions about eligibility for loans.
The effort to produce a ―rule of law index‖ strikes me as deeply misleading. The rule of law is a political ideal. Law plays a multitude of roles,
and it has an infinite variety of manifestations. It is dubious to suggest that
this ideal—and its degree of realization—can be captured by any statistical
measure. The problem isn’t just that the rule of law—like any ideal—is
understood in different ways (ways that change by place and time); the
problem is that no two realizations of the rule-of-law ideal are alike. The
rule of law in Japan is not like the rule of law in the United States, which is
not like the rule of law in France, and so forth.
These final comments are directly tied to the distinction between legal
development and Law and Development set forth above. Talk about the
rule of law is the product of the Western-driven Law and Development enterprise, not legal development. Rule-of-law talk is immensely popular
with funding agencies, reflecting the prominence of the rule-of-law slogan
in global political discourse. Legal development is not immediately about
developing the rule of law (although the latter may follow from the former).
No one knows what the ―rule of law‖ is in any concrete sense, and no one
knows how to bring it about. Legal development involves specific problems involving the construction and functioning of law and legal institutions and concrete, directed efforts at reform. Legal development is a retail
enterprise—it’s about improving the functioning of legal institutions, getting them to serve the needs of the populace, the government, and the economy. Although I have doubts about the Law and Development enterprise,
about legal development I am optimistic.
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AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE ON LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
Yuka Kaneko*
First, as to the issue of whether Law and Development is a ―field,‖ I
don’t see much need to decide between the answers given by contributors
based on the respective focus and/or purpose of studies. There are varieties
of answers (L-for-D, L-v.-D, L-beyond-D, legal development, etc.), and any
discrimination among them will limit our future. I would prefer a definition
based on our methodological common ground, a common ground in which I
will join Anna Gelpern for her basic empiricist description of ―Law and
Development Broad.‖19 One of the attractions of the Law and Development
school is that we commonly approach ―law‖ and ―development‖ by induction from the facts, instead of deduction from some given set of values or
thoughts (for example, rule of law, convergence, legal origin, etc.). This
inductive approach can yield values and theories but only as hypotheses
open to the possibility of disproof. We never stop revisiting dynamic forefronts of legal development and find great enthusiasm in encountering phenomena. Applying different analytical methods, we often maintain a
constant, arms-length distance (as delicate as that of war correspondents)
from phenomena. In this orbit, out of what seems at first glance a patchwork of anecdotes, we will continue to develop some larger, consolidated
discipline of critical studies.
But can this minimum kind of methodological definition add anything
new to the stream of critical studies since the 1960–70s, as Tom Ginsburg’s
second question asks?20 Perhaps, methodologically, we are still in pursuit
of the same attempt initiated by Trubek and Galanter,21 and we must stick to
the routine of testing every possible combination of traditional legal approaches (such as text analysis) with various empirical approaches (both
qualitative and quantitative) learned from such fields as sociology, anthropology, historical studies, and economics, as far as this field claims a
science.
As to the substance, however, we could have reached some new dimension by now. But we are still circling around the same questions (of
―Law and Development Narrow‖22) asked in the 1970s. One of our shortcomings in this area is the lack of response to the deepening dualism seen in
attempts at defining ―development.‖ We know there is, on the one hand, a
group of economic growth-oriented donors (World Bank, ADB, USAID,
*
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etc.), and a group of human development-oriented donors (UNDP, EU, etc.)
on the other. This divide causes serious confusion in the legal-development
process of many recipient countries. The former group appears to have
amended its definition to be closer to that of the human development group,
but each has always given funding in one of the two separate contexts, and
they have never met to produce an integrated definition. The latter has specifically aimed at areas separate from economic development, as if there
were an implicit conspiracy among donors to live separately. Donors can
thus be pluralistic, but each targeted legal system is a single reality. What
has resulted is a problematic legal pluralism: the formal law of developing
countries is pressed for the transplantation of ―model laws,‖ often copying
the recent deregulation agenda of U.S. law (a result of U.S. political capture, according to Daniel Kaufmann23), while the intersection between this
changing formal law and the existing order has been left untouched amid
normative confusion. Yet it is this very intersection where an integrated
normative answer must be sought in order to conciliate the various socioeconomic tensions that arise in the course of development. Our academic
works tend to stay away from this touchy area, sticking to either side of donors’ divided definitions. Without stepping into this intersection and closely observing the local struggles for an integrated normative regime (or, put
in Tamanaha’s way, redefining Law and Development-oriented projects
through legal development, or, more simply, law beyond development24), it
is difficult for us to concretize any post-modern alternative definitions of
the field that go beyond the 1970s’ anti-modernist context.
As to the future of our field, I can think of two roles: Law-forDevelopment criticisms, and Law-beyond-Development studies. We have
heard enough discussions of law as an instrument of development (Law-forDevelopment), where the definition of development has often been monopolized by new-liberalists’ interpretation of U.S. models. For example, we
see a bankruptcy law model based on the rescue myth of Chapter 11; the
corporate law model copying Delaware deregulation; the property law
model maximizing the full effect of ownership over other preferential
rights; the competition law model of the Chicago school with efficiencybased exceptions under the total welfare test; all of which are imposed
through compulsory mechanisms such as loan conditionalities and performance ratings such as the ROSC, often controlled by the World Bank
(which cautiously avoids criticisms, as does the IMF) and are backed by
remarkably attractive academic justifications, such as LLSV’s legal origins,
convergence, and legal transplant theories. One of the indispensable tasks
in our Law and Development field is the critical evaluation of the outcomes
seen when applying these models. This task, however, seems to be almost
23
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done, since the very origin country of the models is now in an unprecedented financial crisis. It is also ironic that the recipients who were the most
earnest in adopting the same models have turned out to be the ones most seriously affected by the world financial crisis.25
Our next task, then, could be to propose alternative models. Some of
the symposium contributors refer to specific candidates or a single universal
alternative,26 and I myself have been working on liberal alternatives for reregulation learned from various comparative-knowledge studies, including
that from pre-deregulation U.S. laws.27 John Cioffi appears to be working
in the same direction,28 but recipient countries seem fed up with universal
models already29—especially after the undeniable failure of the vigorously
campaigned for new-liberalists’ models. We must face this loss of trust in
the legal assistance provided by individual (either bilateral or multilateral)
donors. Instead, we should expect an increasing role for a truly multilateral
approach, for example, in such well-represented forums as UNCITRAL,
which have a long tradition of appreciating differences among jurisdictions
and of addressing these differences and conflicts of laws.30 It should be a
task of those in the Law and Development field to guide such truly multilateral efforts in order to ensure they better meet different local needs, as suggested by Salil Mehra,31 Daniel Sokol,32 and other practitioners.
Even if we pursue multilateral approaches, however, there still seem to
be some areas left for individual legal assistance, to accompany each different path of legal development, as Tamanaha implies.33 Given the economic
growth-oriented bias of formal lawmaking in many countries, it will continue to be the task of Law and Development practitioners to watch over the
25
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intersection of formal law and informal norms. If this redefinition process
requires any involvement by legal assistance donors, they must be a new
type of donor, one that seeks to assist local initiatives for change rather than
to transplant externally developed models.
A question in this vein is whether the typical approach of human
rights-oriented donors (such as UNDP and EU), which try to isolate and
preserve informal norms separately from the formal law regime,34 is correct.
Experience has shown that this type of separate reform only maintains the
normative gap and is doomed to gradually diminish and, ultimately, lead to
the extinction of communal rights.35 It is probably more realistic to provide
for efficient procedural mechanisms (or ―secondary rules‖ in H.L.A. Hart’s
sense) that allow the local people to assert their own informal norms within
the formal system and to re-write the ―captured‖ formal law from the bottom up. Watching this internal dynamism toward integrated legal development (or Law-beyond-Development) will continue to be the most attractive
part of Law and Development studies.
I would like to interpret the ―what works‖ approach of Katarina Pistor36
and Mariana Prado37 in this context of reliance on ―secondary rules.‖ We
may assist the search for workable procedural rules for local people to develop their own norms, but we should be prohibited from pressing on them
any more external models of primary rules. To demonstrate the point, I
would like to touch on a radical implication of Japanese bilateral legal assistance.
Although Japan has been considered a source of the ―statist‖ model,
and, therefore, its economic distress in the 1990s (which was actually not as
serious as it was portrayed by neo-liberalists) is deemed as evidence of the
―retreat of state,‖38 its legal experience should be more holistically understood within the intersection of statist public law and civil law development.
I will not deny that Japan’s economic success was a result of an exportoriented growth strategy led by bureaucrats (who were guided by the U.S.
Pax-Americana strategy of creating bilateral spokes of economic dependency worldwide, where the United States is always a sole hub) and based on
the myth of bottomless U.S. consumption guaranteed by the strong-dollar
34
See, e.g., 1 COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR, MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR
EVERYONE
29–40
(2008),
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.undp.org/publications/Making_the_Law_Work_for_Everyon
e%2520(final%2520rpt).pdf&ei=5v75Suv9OZS0NoPzlMsK&sa=X&oi=nshc&resnum=1&ct=result&cd
=1&ved=0CAgQzgQoAA&usg=AFQjCNHyPJPU19WS_PgV_CmIdAiFmKaOrg (link).
35
Yuka Kaneko, New Trends in Land Dispute Resolutions in Asia: Interaction Between Formal and
Informal Forums (2009) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
Association, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
36
Katharina Pistor, There Is No Single Field of Law and Development, in Symposium: The Future
of Law and Development, Part I, supra note 1, at 168.
37
Mariana Prado, The Misuse of Law and Development?, in Symposium: The Future of Law and
Development, Part II, supra note 2, at 174.
38
See Cioffi, supra note 2, at 183.
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myth (financed by China/Japan’s export earnings), but with two important
reservations. First, this Japanese experience was a law-centered one, as opposed to the usual statist description: bureaucrats are extremely lawcentered people (at least in the sense of Rechtstaat); even the Ministry of International Trade and Industry’s notorious anti-cartel guidance had to be
based on each individual bill passed at the Japanese Diet, where both communist and socialist parties had voices.39 And industrial sectors are bound
by sophisticated commercial-law regimes, where the famous negotiation
culture is built on the common understanding of what the law is; even every
household has a pocket-size code book! Second, Japan’s successful economic development could have been miscarried if not for internal modifications, developed through social struggles, which worked to redefine the
excessive capitalist orientation of the government from the bottom up.
Such modification has often taken place through civil dispute resolution.
When viewed through this civil struggle, the Japanese experience is far
from a statist model. The East Asian model seems nothing but a partial,
distorted interpretation of the Japanese experience, created by the authoritarian ASEAN political leaders’ ―Look East‖ policy, which was, via ASEANJapan economic ministers’ meetings, imported and re-exported by careless
MITI bureaucrats in the new clothes of the ―East Asian miracle,‖ which has
been harshly criticized in the Japanese academy.40
What deserves more serious notice is the civil litigation system in Japan. Although it has been criticized by American scholars due to its low
usage and slow speed, the Japanese litigation system does have another aspect: it has occasionally been used as a radical tool for social change, especially where everyday disputes rise to the level of social conflict.41 Lower
court judges have been trying their best, within the limits of legal formalism
and judicial integrity, to respond to social calls for solving various normative conflicts in the course of capitalist development (such as land/housing
tenant protection, communal rights protection, pollution victim compensation, restriction of dismissal, small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SME)
protection against exploitation by large corporations, and women’s equal
opportunity for employment) in ways that reach beyond the limit of formal
written laws, which often are captured by state and industrial interests. Major weapons for judges are the techniques of legal interpretation based on
general principles of civil code and constitutional norms, which provide sophisticated justifications for defending their own judgments. Given the

39
This is the point that the Japanese government has asserted in its reports to the WTO’s Working
Group on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy.
40
See, e.g., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (Masahiko Aoki, Hyung-Ki Kim & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara eds., 1996).
41
See JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW (1998); FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987).
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well-known passive stance of Japanese judges in administrative suits, these
activist techniques in civil litigations are notable.
This historically tested Japanese knowledge could be useful, especially
in a similar socio-political setting where the government is extremely
growth oriented and the secondary rules for bottom-up normative modification are necessary. Actually, Japan seems a unique donor in the context of
secondary-rule contribution.42 Its primary assistance (operated by the Ministry of Justice) has been concentrated in the civil law area—especially in
the drafting of civil and civil procedure codes, and also in judicial training—with a slight technical contribution in commercial law. It has, however, never been attempted in the public law area, which may go against the
often-held image of Japan as an exporter of the developmental-state, or
Asian-miracle, model.
It deserves notice that, in this view of Japanese civil law assistance,
persistent stress has been put on the ―independence of individual adjudication,‖ which is quite in contrast to the usual concern of many donors for the
―institutional independence‖ of the judiciary from the other state organs.
The Japanese prescription has been to improve the quality of judgments
through technical training in application of laws and reference to judicial
precedents. The logic behind this approach is that improved quality of individual judgment is the best means of defense for adjudicative independence against not only external, but also internal, pressures in the
judiciary—especially when backed by a comprehensive judgmentdisclosure system and qualified social critiques. This unique essence of
Japanese assistance has been developed by ex-judges who have the experience of sitting on the bench for their whole careers amid both internal and
external pressures on their adjudicative independence. Without first understanding this kind of holistic socio-political setting behind each case, we
cannot discuss ―what works‖ in any individual context.

42
See, e.g., Yuka Kaneko, A Japanese Internist Approach to the Judicial Reform in Vietnam: A Review of Civil Procedures and Cassation Cases (2009) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, on file with the Northwestern University Law Review).
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